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AN UNBALANCED DEBATE
Scarcity or Abundance? A Debate
on the Environment. Norman Myers
and Julian L. Simon. Norton, New
York, 1994. 254 pp. $21.00 (ISBN
0-393-03590-5 cloth).
This book is structured as a debate
between professor of business administration Julian Simon and environmentalist Norman Myers. Each
author in turn presents a preface, a
predebate statement, the debate itself, and a postdebate statement.
The topic could not be more important: the future of the species Homo
sapiens. The debate format is both a
strength and a weakness in exploring this issue.
The book does an admirable job
of exposing the two distinct arguments, but the debate format puts
the issues in stark, confrontational
contrast and exhorts the reader to
decide who is right. This format
appeals to journalists trying to
achieve balanced coverage, but ironically the complex and important
issues that are the subject of the
debate (e.g., population growth and
biodiversity loss) become muddied
rather than sharpened when subjected to this format. They are not
black-and-white issues, and accentuating the debate hinders the participants' ability to paint a richer,
multicolored picture and achieve
consensus on appropriate courses of
action. In addition (and strikingly
in this case), the journalistic search
for balance often pits a broad scientific consensus against a few crackpots willing to take the opposite
position-hardly an accurate picture of the true balance of opinion
in the community. We do need a
thorough and ongoing discussion,
but the format should be one of
truly balanced and interactive dialogue rather than confrontational
debate in the journalistic style.
The Simon-Myers debate is truly
unbalanced. Myers represents the
broad scientific consensus that unchecked human population growth
and biodiversity loss are potentially
serious problems that we must address because their impacts, while
uncertain, are potentially huge and
irreversible. Simon represents an
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extreme technological optimist position (a small minority among scientists) that we do not need to worry,
because the future will take care of
itself just as it always has. Simon's
only supporting data are selected
past trends, most of which start in
1800, and the blind faith that these
trends are likely to continue into the
indefinite future-a dangerous technique that can be described as driving while looking only in the rearview mirror. Simon argues that we
just need to take a long enough
historical view to see that all trends
in human material well-being are
improving. But if one adheres to
Simon's advice and takes an even
longer-term view, one sees that most
historical civilizations (e.g., Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Roman,
Olmec, Chacoan, and Mayan) have
collapased due to inattention to the
degradation of their resource bases
(Pointer 1991, Tainter 1988, Yoffee
and Cowgill 1988). The question is:
Can our current global civilization
break from this trend and achieve
sustainability?
The fundamental differences between Simon and Myers are not technical, they are differences of vision.
Myers envisions a physically finite
planet that we must manage for sustainability. Simon envisions a world
of no constraints (except the number of people), where humanity is
ultimately freed from its earthly
bonds to explore and colonize the
universe at will forever.
This Star Trek-like vision is popular and appealing to some. But how
realistic is it, and does it make sense
to bet the farm on it? NASA's budget
is tenuous at best, and the prospects
for space colonization seem remote.
Even if we do eventually manage to
explore the stars, the prospect is far
enough in the future that we cannot
use it to avoid resolving current
earthly problems.
Simon's extreme, blind optimism
about the future often borders on
the ridiculous. For example, consider the following quote by Simon:
We now have in our hands-in
our libraries, really-the technology to feed, clothe, and supply
energy to an ever-growing population for the next 7 billion years.
Most amazing is that most of this

specific body of knowledge developed within the past hundred years
or so, though it rests on knowledge that had accumulated for
millennia, of course.
Indeed, the last necessary additions to this body of knowledgenuclear fission and space traveloccurred decades ago. Even if no
new knowledge were ever invented
after those advances, we could go
on increasing forever, improving
our standard of living and our
control over our environment. The
discovery of genetic manipulation
certainly enhances our powers
greatly, . but even without it we
could have continued our progress
forever. (p. 65)

Simon obviously does not understand large numbers and exponential growth. Seven billion years is a
very long time (the estimated age of
the universe is only around 10 to 20
billion years; Trefil 1985). At a 2%
annual growth rate the physical biomass of humans would approach
the mass of the entire universe in
only tens of thousands of yearsl,
hardly a realistic prospect by even
the wild stretches of imagination of
which Simon seems to be fully capable.
There are also several ironies in
Simon's position. For example, for
Simon's predictions to work, he asserts, we have to worry about our
problems. Problems always result in
solutions, according to Simon, so
bring on the problems-we will always solve them, and things will get
'It is instructive to work through the calculations. Assuming a current human population of 6 x 10 9 people with an average mass
of 80 kg, the current human biomass is
approximately 5 x 10" kg. At a 2% rate of
exponential growth, the mass of humanity
at any time t in the future = 5 x 10" kg •
eC 02 • t ). The mass of the earth is approximately 6 x 10 24 kg, the sun is 2 x 10 30 kg, a
galaxy with ten billion suns is 2 x 10 40 kg,
and, just as a guess, assuming the visible
universe has the equivalent of 100 trillion
galaxies, its mass would be 2 x 10 54 kg. The
time from the present at a 2 % exponential
growth rate required for the human biomass
to equal that of the entire earth is 1510
years. To equal the mass of the sun, 2140
years are required . To reach the mass of the
galaxy, 3290 years are necessary, and the
mass of 100 trillion galaxies are reached in
only 4900 years, less than five millennia.
Seven billion years of exponentially growing
human population is obviously not even close
to conceivable.
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continuously better. But there is also
a "what, me worry?" attitude embedded in the "always" part of this
assertion. The irony is that we have
to think and act as if there were
problems and work to find solutions-just as Myers is doingrather than adopting the blind faith
attitude that things will always work
out (as Simon does). No matter who
is right, we have to think and act
like Myers, even for Simon's own
predictions to have a chance of coming true.
A second irony is Simon's eagerness to bet on the outcome of his
predictions. He states, "Would I bet
on it? For sure. I'll bet a week's or
month's pay-anything I win goes
to pay for more research-that just
about any trend pertaining to material human welfare will improve
rather than get worse" (p. 115).
While Simon often says he will bet
anyone any amount, he has so far
refused to accept a $100,000 bet
from Paul Hawken 2 that living systems will continue to deteriorate
over the next ten years. Much has
been made of Simon's actually winning a $1000 bet with Paul Ehrlich,
John Holdren, and John Harte that
the market prices for five metals
(copper, chrome, nickel, tin, and
tungsten) would fall between 1980
and 1990. Although these metals
represent an insignificant part of
the problem, their market prices are
not necessarily a good measure of
long-term scarcity. As Myers points
out, they" do not reflect all costs of
production and consumption." Full
social cost pricing would probably
tell a different story from market
prices. Also, if one is liquidating
assets (as we are doing with many
natural resources), then one would
expect market prices to fall, as they
would in a fire-sale situation.
But most important, Simon's bet
offers trivialize a critical matter. The
magnitude of the bet we are really
being asked to make on our species'
future is inconsistent with Simon's
cavalier betting attitude. We do not
have a spare planet waiting in the
wings in case Simon loses, and the
first rule of a successful gambler is
not to wager more than you can
2P. Hawken, 1995, personal communication.
The Natural Step, Cambridge, MA.
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afford to lose. With the future of the
species at stake (not just a "week's
or a month's pay"), it is a bet we
cannot afford to take. The more
rational position here, in this case of
extreme uncertainty and ultra high
stakes, is one of skeptical precaution. Let us assume, as Myers recommends, that there are likely to be
problems and let us allow ourselves
to be pleasantly surprised if they can
be worked out, or, even better, if
they turn out not to be as big as we
first thought. But the most irrational thing we can do is to bet on our
ability to solve all future problems,
as Simon would have us do.
There is more grist for argument
in this book than I have been able to
touch upon here. The debate format
accentuates conflict and argument,
at the price, I fear, of deeper understanding and consensus building. We
need much more of the latter and
much less of the former to really
address the critical problems raised
in this book.
ROBERT COSTANZA
Institute for Ecological Economics
Center for Environmental and
Estuarine Studies
University of Maryland System
Box 38
Solomons, MD 20688-0038
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TIlE BROWN CRUSADE
The Green Crusade: Rethinking the
Roots of Environmentalism. Charles
T. Rubin. The Free Press, Macmillan,
New York, 1994. 312 pp. $22.95
(ISBN 0-02-927525-3 cloth).
Charles T. Rubin is associate professor of political science at
Duquesne University in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. Geneticist Garrett
Hardin brought the book to my at-

tention. Rubin describes Hardin's
entry into the ethical maelstrom
posed by current human excesses.
But praise for The Green Crusade
on the dust cover from Jeffrey
Salmon, executive director of the
Marshall Institute; Frederick Seitz,
former president of the National
Academy of Sciences; and Richard
Lindzen, a scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technologyno friends of the environment-ran
up warning flags.
Rubin has entered the fray with a
candidly self-described bias: "Where
once I saw a movement founded in
science, now I see a utopian political
program. Where once I felt that the
problems were obvious to all, now I
understand that different situations
can appear to people to be problems
depending on how they want the
world to be in the future. Where
once I knew exactly what grand solutions would solve all environmental ills, now I believe there is a great
deal to be said for modest expectations and muddling through" (p. 9).
That, too, is a political program,
close enough to the neoconservative
agenda to bring political plaudits
from the far right. It has also clouded
the thinking in much of this often
scholarly and provocative book.
Rubin describes the dominant
personalities of science and conservation of the recent three decades
including Rachel Carson, Hardin,
Barry Commoner, Paul Ehrlich, and
The Club of Rome. He is not burdened by science, by curiosity about
it, or by sympathy for science or
scientists. He labels his subjects
popularizers, which he uses as a
pejorative term for people who aspire to what he considers to be a
political agenda: improving the
workings of the world.
His treatment of Carson is superficial slander straight from the propaganda of the pesticides industry.
She provided an "unbalanced, biased"
review, according to Rubin, who
selected virtually any scientist's criticism as valid and a sound basis for
castigation. There is no recognition
of Carson's brilliance in assembling
shards of data and insights from her
own experience to offer a sharply
divergent and meticulously accurate
analysis that stands today as correct
as it was when her book Silent
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